LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY THE COMMON LAW WORLD VOLUME IIPDF|Epub|txt|kindle电子书版本网盘下载

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Part Ⅰ - Prologue1

Chapter 1 - Analytic Jurisprudence Established3

1.1.Austinian Orthodoxy5

1.1.1.Holland’s Opus5

1.1.2.Austinian Orthodoxy Challenged6

1.1.2.1.Commands and Complications7

1.1.2.2.Limits of the Sovereignty Doctrine9

1.2.Dicey: The Sovereignty of Parliament and the Supremacy of Law13

1.3.Salmond: Positivism Recast18

1.3.1.Jurisprundentia Universalis—The Science of Civil Law18

1.3.2.The Nature of Cavil Law19

1.3.3.Ultimate Legal Principles and Judicial Recognition21

1.3.4.Salmond and Analytic Jurisprudence24

1.4.Matters of Method25

1.4.1.Analytic Jurisprudence: General vs.Particular26

1.4.2.The Province of Analytic Jurisprudence29

1.4.3.Dissenting Voices32

1.4.3.1.Miller: Jurisprudence in the Scottish Tradition33

1.4.3.2.Moderate Dissent at Mid-Century35

1.4.3.3.Oakeshott: Philosophical Jurisprudence Reconceived36

1.4.4.Glanville Williams: Convergence of Philosophy and Jurisprudence39

Chapter 2 - Justice Holmes: A New Path for American Jurisprudence43

2.1.Holmes:The Man and the Mind45

2.1.1.Jurist, Judge, Justice45

2.1.2.Orientation46

2.2.Common Law, Science, and Positivism48

2.2.1.“Formalism” and Langdell’s Science of Law49

2.2.2.Pollock’s Predictions51

2.3.Holmes’s Static Conception of Law57

2.3.1.Common-Law Orientation57

2.3.2.Enforcement Positivism59

2.3.3.Law, Morality, and the Bad Man62

2.4.Holmes’s Dynamic Conception of Law64

2.4.1.The Life of the Law64

2.4.2.The Dynamic Interaction of Form and Substance66

2.5.Law, Theory, and Adjudication70

2.5.1.Holmes’s General Jurisprudence70

2.5.2.Theory, Skepticism, and Adjudication73

Part Ⅱ - The Holmesian Legacy79

Chapter 3 - Realism and Reaction81

3.1.Roots of Realism81

3.1.1.Movement or Mood, Metaphysics or Method?82

3.1.2.Fabricators of the Tools of the Realist Trade84

3.1.2.1.Gray: Law vs.Sources and the Importance of Finality84

3.1.2.2.Pound: Two Forms of Jurisprudential Empiricism89

3.1.2.3.Dewey: The Logic of Inquiry95

3.1.3.Hohfeld: Analytic Jurisprudence in Realism’s Province98

3.1.3.1.Jural Correlatives and Opposites99

3.1.3.2.A General Framework for Analysis of Law103

3.1.3.3.Reception of Hohfeld’s Analytic Jurisprudence104

3.2.Realism: Skepticisms and Remedies106

3.2.1.Rules: Paper and Proper107

3.2.2.Rules and Reasoning in Judicial Decision Making110

3.2.2.1.Conflicting Rules110

3.2.2.2.Finding the Ratio Decidendi and the Problem of Generalization111

3.2.2.3.The Problem of Determination: Authority and the Judgment Gap113

3.2.2.4.Argument from the Conclusion:Judicial Window Dressing118

3.2.2.5.The Problem of Relevance: Fact-Skepticism121

3.3.If Not Rules, What?122

3.3.1.Failures of Formalism123

3.3.2.Realist Science of Law124

3.3.2.1.Impartial Idiosyncrasy126

3.3.2.2.Jurisprudence as Social Science127

3.3.2.3.Law Jobs: Llewellyn’s Conception of Legal Science131

3.3.3.Recovery of Craft and Principle132

3.3.3.1.Pound, Cardozo, and Reasoned Elaboration133

3.3.3.2.Llewellyn: The Discipline of Craft135

3.3.3.3.Levi: The Forum of Principle137

3.4.Conclusion138

Chapter 4 - Implicit Law and Principles of Legality141

4.1.Charting a New Path142

4.1.1.Legal Realism vs.Legal Reality142

4.1.2.Sovereignty and the Foundations of Legal Order143

4.2.Human Interaction and the Law146

4.2.1.Eunomics: The Science of Good Social Order147

4.2.2.Interactional Foundations of Law147

4.2.2.1.Interaction and Informal Social Rules148

4.2.2.2.Interactional Dimensions of Contract,Case Law, and Statute149

4.2.2.3.Vertical Interaction and Congruence151

4.3.The Internal Morality of Law153

4.3.1.Immanent Reason154

4.3.2.Law’s Internal Morality155

4.3.3.Legality and Substantive Justice161

4.4.Spontaneous Order and the Foundations of Law162

4.4.1.Spontaneous Order and Social Rules164

4.4.1.1.The Idea of Spontaneous Order164

4.4.1.2.Social Rules: Implicit and Abstract166

4.4.2.The Informational Conditions of Thetic Law168

4.4.3.Modern Law as a Mixed Order170

4.5.Nomos, Liberty, and the Rule of Law172

4.5.1.The Rule of Law in The Constitution of Liberty172

4.5.2.Nomos, the Law of Liberty174

4.5.3.The Value of Liberty175

4.6.Common-Law Adjudication and Hayek’s Arguments for Law-as-Nomos176

4.7.Conclusion180

Chapter 5 - Economic Jurisprudence181

5.1.Roots, Ambitions, and Projects181

5.1.1.Realism and Neo-Classical Economic Theory181

5.1.2.Theoretical Ambitions of Law and Economics183

5.1.2.1.Basic Theoretical Assumptions184

5.1.2.2.Projects and Theses: Analytic, Explanatory,and Normative185

5.1.2.3.Law and Economics and General Jurisprudence189

5.2.Analytical Tools190

5.2.1.Concepts of Efficiency190

5.2.1.1.Utility and the Pareto Criteria190

5.2.1.2.Kaldor-Hicks and Wealth Maximization191

5.2.2.Virtual Markets, Transaction Costs, and Legal Rules192

5.3.Positive Economics: Case Law, Torts, and Deep Explanation194

5.3.1.Efficiency Explains the Law194

5.3.2.The Case-Law Thesis Illustrated: An Economic Theory of Tort Law195

5.3.3.Evidence and Explanation197

5.3.3.1.The Empirical Case for the Case-Law Thesis197

5.3.3.2.Functional-Causal Explanation198

5.3.3.3.Interpretive Explanation200

5.3.3.4.Economics as the Logic of Law201

5.4.Efficiency as a Political Norm202

5.4.1.Is Social Wealth a Value?202

5.4.2.The Proxy Principle and Ex Ante Consent204

5.5.Pragmatism and Politics206

Chapter 6 - Critical Jurisprudence and the Rule of Law213

6.1.Progressive Politics and Critical Theories213

6.2.Law as Ideology and the Ideology of Law215

6.2.1.Law as Ideology215

6.2.2.Ideology Analysis in Critical Jurisprudence217

6.2.2.1.Law as Patriarchy217

6.2.2.2.Law as Politics220

6.3.The Indeterminacy Critique224

6.3.1.Structure of the Argument225

6.3.2.Dimensions of Indeterminacy226

6.3.3.Sources of Law’s Indeterminacy228

6.3.3.1.Impoverished Opulence228

6.3.3.2.Theory-Dependence229

6.3.3.3.Patchworks, Political Forces,and Fundamental Contradictions231

6.3.4.Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law235

6.4.Oppression, Objectivity, and Law240

6.4.1.Oppression242

6.4.2.Law’s Complicity in Gender Oppression244

6.4.2.1.Man is the Measure245

6.4.2.2.Impoverished Legal Reason248

6.4.2.3.Objectivity as Objectification251

6.5.Attack on the Citadel257

Part Ⅲ - Hart and His Legacy259

Chapter 7 - Hart’s Critical Positivism261

7.1.Hart and Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century261

7.1.1.Hart’s Project261

7.1.2.Hart’s Philosophical Resources264

7.1.2.1.Bentham, “Greats,” and the Two Austins264

7.1.2.2.Philosophical Techniques:Alternatives to Definition and Description265

7.1.3.Hart’s Theory of Law in Outline267

7.2.Hart’s Critical Frame271

7.2.1.The Strategy of The Concept of Law271

7.2.2.Against Reduction273

7.2.2.1.Kinds of Laws and their Functions274

7.2.2.2.Normativity and Empirical Reductionism279

7.2.3.Transcendental Inflation of Normativity283

7.3.Social Rules285

7.3.1.Hart’s Hermeneutics286

7.3.2.The Internal Point of View291

7.3.2.1.Accept and Use as Guides292

7.3.2.2.Interior vs.Insider294

7.3.2.3.Social Rules and Conventions297

7.3.3.Obligation: Social and Legal299

7.3.4.Challenges to Hart’s Account of Normativity301

7.4.Social Rules and Legal Systems304

7.4.1.The Luxury of Legal Validity305

7.4.2.The Sobering Truth about Law307

7.5.The Rule of Recognition309

7.5.1.The Idea of a Rule of Recognition310

7.5.2.The Unity, Persistence, and Systematic Character of Law314

7.5.3.Ultimacy and the Normative Foundations of Law317

7.5.4.The Rule of Recognition and the Social Foundations of Law319

7.6.Adjudication321

7.7.Lead Us not into Temptation: Resisting the Pull of Natural Law325

7.7.1.Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals325

7.7.2.Natural Law as a Theory of Legal Validity326

7.7.3.The Minimal Demands of Natural Necessity329

7.7.4.Justice in the Administration of Law and the Rule of Law334

7.7.5.Positivism and Jurisprudential Method336

Chapter 8 - Positivism Extended: Institutions, Sources, Authority, and Law341

8.1.Hart’s Legacy341

8.2.Institutionalism342

8.2.1.The Idea of an Institutionalized Normative Order343

8.2.2.Law as an Institutionalized Normative Order346

8.3.Basic Themes in Raz’s Theory of Law348

8.3.1.Hartian Pedigree349

8.3.2.Methodology of Legal Theory350

8.3.3.Law’s Claim to Legitimate Authority353

8.3.4.The Sources Thesis355

8.4.The Case for the Sources Thesis356

8.4.1.Authority Requires Sources357

8.4.2.The Service Conception of Authority360

8.4.2.1.Authority and Exclusionary Reasons360

8.4.2.2.The Justification of Authority364

8.4.2.3.Authority and Coordination367

8.5.Law’s Claim to Authority: Challenges369

8.5.1.Questioning Authority370

8.5.2.Law’s Authority and Raz’s Claims for It372

8.5.2.1.Non Sequiturs372

8.5.2.2.Just What Does Law Claim?375

8.6.Legal Reasoning377

8.6.1.Applying the Law, Determining the Law, and Moral Reasoning378

8.6.1.1.Directed Powers379

8.6.1.2.Two Aspects of Legal Reasoning380

8.6.2.The Impossibility of a Theory of Legal Reasoning385

8.7.Formalism Again: The Rule of Rules388

8.7.1.A Neo-Formalist Model of Practical Reasoning389

8.7.1.1.Neo-Formalist Analytic390

8.7.1.2.The Normative Case for Neo-Formalist Practical Reasoning393

8.7.1.3.The Asymmetry of Authority395

8.7.2.Neo-Formalist Jurisprudence: Rules and Law396

Chapter 9 - Positivism Challenged: Interpretation, Integrity, and Law401

9.1.Challengers401

9.2.Principles and Controversy404

9.2.1.The Province of Principles404

9.2.1.1.Principles in Practice405

9.2.1.2.Positivism’s Divided House407

9.2.2.The Claims of Controversy411

9.2.3.Positivist Conventions Feel the Sting of Controversy415

9.3.Interpretive Jurisprudence421

9.3.1.Against Archimedes421

9.3.2.The Practice of Interpretation425

9.3.2.1.The Interpretive Attitude425

9.3.2.2.The Domain of Constructive Interpretation426

9.3.2.3.The Dynamics of Constructive Interpretation: Data, Fit, and Appeal430

9.3.3.Can There Be a Best Theory?434

9.4.Law as Integrity438

9.4.1.An Interpretive Plateau438

9.4.2.Conventionalism: A Challenger in Interpretive Clothing440

9.4.3.Law’s Integrity443

9.4.3.1.Political Responsibility, Justice, and Integrity444

9.4.3.2.Law as Integrity446

9.4.3.3.The Problem of the Wicked Legal System448

9.4.4.Questioning Integrity451

9.4.4.1.On the Possibility of Principles451

9.4.4.2.Whose Integrity?453

Chapter 10 - The Incorporation Debate457

10.1.Explaining the Difference Moral Principles Make457

10.1.1.Elmer, The Duke, and Dr.Bonham457

10.1.2.It’s a Mistake458

10.1.3.A Case for Incorporation459

10.1.4.Employed but not Incorporated.Exclusive Legal Positivism461

10.1.5.Incorporation by Common Practice of Argument: Inclusive Legal Positivism463

10.1.6.Natural-Law Perspectives on Incorporation467

10.2.The Dialectic in the Positivist Camp470

10.2.1.The Fiction of the Midas Touch471

10.2.2.The Compatibility of Conventionalism and Incorporation474

10.2.3.Implications of the Practical Dimension of Law478

10.2.3.1.The Challenge of the Argument from Authority478

10.2.3.2.Practical Guidance, Authoritative Directives, and Directed Powers481

Chapter 11 - Conventions and the Foundations of Law483

11.1.Conventions, Conventionalisms, and Law483

11.1.1.Law and Conventions483

11.1.2.Normativity and Law’s Conventional Foundations485

11.2.Humean Conventions486

11.2.1.Conventions and Social Cooperation486

11.2.1.1.Hume on the Conventions of Justice486

11.2.1.2.Lewis Conventions488

11.2.2.Humean Conventions and the Law493

11.2.2.1.The Rule of Recognition as a Humean Convention494

11.2.2.2.Humean Conventions and the Normativity of Law: Two Approaches497

11.2.3.Humean Conventions Challenged500

11.3.Conventions as Joint Commitments504

11.3.1.Joint Commitments and Shared Cooperative Activities505

11.3.1.1.Existence Conditions of Social Conventions505

11.3.1.2.Conventions, Dispositions, and Reasons506

11.3.2.Duties and Joint Commitments507

11.3.2.1.Conventions as Collective Fiat508

11.3.2.2.Shared Cooperative Activity, Obligation, and Disagreement511

11.3.3.Commitments, Reasons, and Obligations: Some Questions514

11.3.3.1.Dispositions, Commitments and Reasons514

11.3.3.2.Do Joint Commitments Yield （the Right Kind of） Obligations?515

11.3.3.3.On the Possibility of Fundamental Disagreement within Shared Cooperative Activities517

11.4.Constitutive Conventions519

11.4.1.The Concept of Convention Analyzed519

11.4.2.Kinds of Conventions523

11.4.2.1.Constitutive Conventions523

11.4.2.2.Deep vs.Surface Conventions526

11.4.3.Constitutive Conventions and the Foundations of Law526

11.4.4.Constitution, Cooperation, and Convention528

11.4.4.1.Is Law Like Chess?529

11.4.4.2.Convergence531

11.5.Legal Conventionalism Disputed533

11.5.1.Conformism, Arbitrariness, and Moral Seriousness534

11.5.2.Law as a Discursive Practice536

11.5.3.Getting It Together vs.Getting It Right538

11.5.4.The Limits of Formal Conventionalism542

Chapter 12 - Analytic Jurisprudence Confronted547

12.1.Natural-Law Theory’s Ambitions549

12.2.A Natural-Law Theory of Practical Reasonableness551

12.2.1.Basic Human Goods551

12.2.2.Principles of Practical Reasonableness and Morality552

12.3.Natural-Law Jurisprudence: Law, Authority, and the Common Good554

12.3.1.A Natural-Law Challenge to Methodological Positivism555

12.3.2.Practical Reasonableness in Community: Common Good and Poiesis556

12.3.3.Positive Law and Legal Reasoning: Dimensions of Natural-Law Positivism558

12.4.Retrieving Normative Jurisprudence562

12.4.1.The Poverty of Methodological Positivism563

12.4.2.Law’s Habitat: The Circumstances of Politics564

12.5.Authoritative Rules, Systematic Integrity, and Argument: Waldron’s Normative Jurisprudence565

12.5.1.The Normative Case for a Positivist Conception of Law565

12.5.2.Publicity, Systematicity, and the Argumentative Nature of Law568

12.5.3.The Artificial Reason of Law: Judicial Reasoning as an Institution-Shaped Hybrid571

Chapter 13 - Concluding Note577

13.1.Vera Philosophia577

13.2.On the Threshold of a Philosophical Jurisprudence578

Bibliography585

Index of Subjects607

Index of Names613