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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION1

Section 1.1 Research Background1

Section 1.2 Research Objectives4

Section 1.3 Research Methodology5

Section 1.4 Structure of the Book8

CHAPTER TWO AGENCY THEORY VERSUS STAKEHOLDER THEORY10

Section 2.1 Introduction10

Section 2.2 Agency Theory10

2.2.1 Overview of Agency Theory10

2.2.2 Agency Conflicts and Solutions11

2.2.3 Support and Criticism of Agency Theory14

Section 2.3 Stakeholder Theory and Stakeholder Model21

2.3.1 Stakeholder Theory21

2.3.2 Difficulties and Solutions to Identification of Stakeholders25

2.3.3 Difficulties and Solutions to Implementation of Stakeholder Theory36

Section 2.4 Conclusion46

CHAPTER THREE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY47

Section 3.1 Introduction47

Section 3.2 Revised Model of Stakeholder Theory48

3.2.1 Interest Alignment Mechanisms48

3.2.2 Civil Regulation and Social Capital50

3.2.3 Statutory Regulation and Legal Enforcement57

3.2.4 Justification of Revised Stakeholder Theory Model62

Section 3.3 Applying the Model in Germany and the UK65

3.3.1 Reasons of Applying the Model in Germany and the UK65

3.3.2 Classifying by Legal Systems66

3.3.3 Classifying by Corporate Governance Systems68

Section 3.4 Five Mechanisms for Protecting Stakeholder Interests69

Section 3.5 Conclusion72

CHAPTER FOUR BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN GERMANY AND THE UK73

Section 4.1 Introduction73

Section 4.2 Board of Directors74

4.2.1 Functions of Board of Directors74

4.2.2 Composition of Board of Directors75

4.2.3 Independence of Board of Directors80

4.2.4 Size of Board of Directors85

Section 4.3 Board of Directors in Germany87

4.3.1 Strict Separation of Control and Management87

4.3.2 Codetermination between Employees and Shareholders90

4.3.3 Monitoring Power and Effects of Banks93

Section 4.4 Board of Directors in the UK96

4.4.1 Weak Independence of Board of Directors96

4.4.2 Board Composition without Stakeholder Representatives97

4.4.3 Non-Exhaustive Reform of Company Law99

Section 4.5 Discussion and Conclusion101

CHAPTER FIVE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN GERMANY AND THE UK105

Section 5.1 Introduction105

Section 5.2 Supervisory Role of Institutional Investors106

5.2.1 Significance of Institutional Investor Activism106

5.2.2 Monitoring Incentive of Institutional Investors107

5.2.3 Monitoring Ability of Institutional Investors108

5.2.4 Possible Barriers of Institutional Investor Activism110

5.2.5 Approaches of Institutional Investors for Stakeholder Protection114

5.2.6 Impact of SRI Investments on Stakeholder Interests116

Section 5.3 Institutional Investors in Germany118

5.3.1 Internal Blockholders'Control and Stakeholder Protection118

5.3.2 Development of Socially Responsible Investment119

5.3.3 Market for Partial Corporate Control120

Section 5.4 Institutional Investors in the UK121

5.4.1 Increase of Institutional Share Ownership121

5.4.2 Institutional Investor Activism and Social Reporting System122

5.4.3 Social Performance of Institutional Investors125

Section 5.5 Discussion and Conclusion126

CHAPTER SIX MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN GERMANY AND THE UK130

Section 6.1 Introduction130

Section 6.2 Managerial Compensation System131

6.2.1 Managerial Compensation and Stakeholder Protection131

6.2.2 Managerial Compensation Arrangements and Package132

6.2.3 Managerial Performance Measurement134

6.2.4 Complementary Effects of Other Governance Mechanisms136

6.2.5 Impact of Managerial Compensation on Stakeholder Interests138

Section 6.3 Managerial Compensation System in Germany143

6.3.1 Development of Managerial Compensation System143

6.3.2 Legal Reform of Managerial Compensation System144

Section 6.4 Managerial Compensation System in the UK146

6.4.1 Remedies for Weak Influence of Stakeholders146

6.4.2 Impact of Say-on-Pay Regulation148

6.4.3 Civil Regulatory Pressure of Non-Governmental Organisations149

Section 6.5 Discussion and Conclusion150

CHAPTER SEVEN MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN GERMANY AND THE UK154

Section 7.1 Introduction154

Section 7.2 Market for Corporate Control155

7.2.1 Hostile Takeover and Internal Governance Failure155

7.2.2 Barriers of Market for Corporate Control157

7.2.3 Takeover Impact on Stakeholder Welfare158

Section 7.3 Market for Corporate Control in Germany165

7.3.1 Takeover Market and Takeover Regulations165

7.3.2 Takeover Barriers in Germany167

Section 7.4 Market for Corporate Control in the UK170

7.4.1 Takeover Regulations of the UK170

7.4.2 Elimination of Takeover Barriers in the UK171

7.4.3 Stakeholder Protection in Takeover Process173

Section 7.5 Discussion and Conclusion175

CHAPTER EIGHT TRADE UNION AND LABOUR MARKET IN GERMANY AND THE UK179

Section 8.1 Introduction179

Section 8.2 Trade Union and Labour Market180

8.2.1 Governance Role of Employees180

8.2.2 Trade Union and Firm Performance180

8.2.3 Labour Market and Firm Performance185

Section 8.3 Trade Union and Labour Market in Germany189

8.3.1 Social and Economic Culture in German Labour Market189

8.3.2 Strict Legal Protection for Employment190

8.3.3 Collective Agreement and Employee Protection192

8.3.4 Strict Employment Protection and Labour Market Flexibility193

Section 8.4 Trade Union and Labour Market in the UK194

8.4.1 Social and Economic Culture in UK Labour Market194

8.4.2 Trade Union Recognition and Employee Protection195

8.4.3 Insufficient Rights to Information and Consultation of Employees197

8.4.4 Protection to Other Employee Rights and Stakeholder Interests199

Section 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion200

CHAPTER NINE CONCLUSION205

Section 9.1 Discussion and Contribution205

9.1.1 Significance and Completeness of Stakeholder Theory205

9.1.2 Significance of Revised Stakeholder Theory Model206

9.1.3 Implementation of Stakeholder Theory in Practice208

Section 9.2 Possible Limitations of This Research211

Section 9.3 Implication for Future Research212

REFERENCES214